In this paper, a sex-dependent matrix game haploid model is investigated. For this model, since the phenotypes of female and male individuals are determined by alleles located at a single locus and are sex dependent, any given genotype corresponds to a strategy pair. Thus, a strategy pair is an ESS if and only if the allele corresponding to this strategy pair cannot be invaded by any mutant allele. We show that an ESS equilibrium must be locally asymptotically stable if it exists.
Introduction
Maynard Smith (1974 Smith ( , 1982 ) (see also Maynard Smith & Price, 1973) introduced the fundamental notion of an evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS) in order to explain the evolution of behaviours. Over the past two decades, the concept of ESS has not only proved to be of practical use in the study of animal con#icts but has also generated enormous theoretical research in this area. The matrix game model is one of the most important theoretical models in evolutionary game theory. As pointed out by Lessard (1984) , theoretical population biology models based on random pairwise interactions are an important source of ideas and principles that provide insight into intraspeci"c selection. The original matrix game model developed by Maynard Smith (1982) includes symmetric or asymmetric interactions *Supported by Natural Sciences and Engineering Research Council of Canada, Grant OGP 0008833.
-Author to whom correspondence should be addressed. E-mail: lessards@dms.umontreal.ca between two individuals (see also Hofbauer & Sigmund, 1988) , for example, the Hawk}Dove model and the Battle-of-the-Sexes model. In order to model inter-speci"c frequency-dependent selection, Cressman (1996) extended the classical matrix game model to two-species interactions, both symmetric and asymmetric. A similar model was also discussed by Schuster et al. (1981) . For the two-species matrix game model, Cressman (1996) de"ned the concept of a two-species ESS as a pair of strategies (one for each species) for which, in any given system near the ESS, at least one of the species is "tter if it adopts its ESS component.
The standard matrix game model always operates on the phenotypic level. This implies an assumption of parthenogenetic inheritance (Maynard Smith, 1982) . However, most populations of interest have sexual inheritance. In the context of diploid populations , Maynard Smith (1982) pointed out that if the phenotype (pure or mixed strategy) produced by a genetic homozygote is an ESS, then a sexual population with this genotype will be stable against invasion by any mutant allele. If the ESS cannot be produced by a genetic homozygote, Maynard Smith also analysed the stability of a genetically polymorphic population with two alleles that can generate the ESS proportions.
The matrix game diploid model has been investigated by many authors (Maynard Smith, 1981 , 1982 Eshel, 1982; Hofbauer et al., 1982; Bomze et al., 1983; Hines & Bishop, 1984a, b; Lessard, 1984; Cressman & Hines, 1984; Maynard Smith & Hofbauer, 1986; Koth & Sigmund, 1987; Hofbauer & Sigmund, 1988; Cressman, 1988a, b; Gayley & Michod, 1990; Hines, 1994a, b; Cressman et al., 1996; . A simple two-species matrix game diploid model was also discussed by Tao (1998) . All these models assume that the phenotype is sex independent. This assumption implies that the pure strategy sets for female and male individuals are the same and the phenotypes for female and male individuals are determined by the same loci, i.e. the female and male individuals with the same genotype will have the same phenotype (see also Lessard, 1984; Cressman et al., 1996) . If the pure strategy sets for female and male individuals are di!erent, the phenotypes for female and male individuals can be determined by di!erent loci (see also Koth & Sigmund, 1987; Tao, 1998) . For sex-dependent but frequency-independent viability selection, Karlin & Lessard (1986) provided a thorough analysis of the one-locus model.
In this paper, a sex-and frequency-dependent matrix game model is investigated. The model is a haploid genetic model. In this model, the phenotypes for female and male individuals are determined by alleles located at a single locus and are sex dependent. This model is similar in some aspects to Cressman's (1996) twospecies matrix game model, but the concept of a two-species ESS cannot be applied directly. Our main purpose is to develop ESS theory for sex-and frequency-dependent viability selection. In Section 3, the de"nition of an ESS for sex-and frequency-dependent viability selection and necessary and su$cient conditions for an equilibrium strategy pair to be an ESS are given. In Section 4, we show that an ESS equilibrium must be locally asymptotically stable if it exists.
Basic Assumptions and Model
In this paper, the following assumptions are made:
(I) Consider an in"nite two-sex haploid population undergoing discrete non-overlapping generations in which there are two possible phenotypes (pure strategies), denoted by S and S , in the female population and two phenotypes, denoted by R and R , in the male population. Suppose that two alleles A and A located at a single locus are responsible for the phenotypic determination such that a female (male) individual with genotype A G expresses phenotype S (R ) with probability G ( G ) and phenotype S (R ) with complementary probability 1! G (1! G ) for i"1, 2. Therefore, a particular genotype corresponds to a strategy pair ( , ) where represents the female strategy ( , 1! ) and represents the male strategy ( , 1! ).
(II) Following Maynard Smith (1982) (see also Lessard, 1984 Lessard, , 1990 Hofbauer & Sigmund, 1988; Cressman, 1992 Cressman, , 1996 , we assume that, before the time of reproduction in each generation, the individuals in the population compete randomly in pairwise contests, and that the outcomes of the contests a!ect the viability of the individuals (i.e. the probability of survival from the time of conception to the time of reproduction). From Maynard Smith's (1982) de"nition of symmetric and asymmetric contests, the payo! matrices of symmetric contests between two females and between two males are de"ned by [ (Cressman, 1996; Tao, 1998) .
(III) Mating between mature females and males is random in each generation at the time of reproduction. A further assumption is that there is no fertility selection in the population. 
be the expected total number of o!spring where D and K are the expected numbers of female and male o!spring, respectively. This means that the sex ratio in the population is a "xed constant at the time of conception in each generation (actually, the proportions of female and male individuals in the population are D / and K / , respectively, at the time of conception).
Let p and q be the frequencies of allele A in the female and male populations, respectively, at the time of conception. Then, from assumption (I), the frequency of phenotype S in the female population, denoted by x, and the frequency of phenotype R in the male population, denoted by y, are given by
respectively. Taking into account the sex ratio at the time of conception, the viability "tnesses of phenotypes S and S in the female population, denoted by f and f , and the viability "tnesses of phenotypes R and R in the male population, denoted by m and m , are given by the following functions of x and y:
and
respectively. Therefore, from assumption (II), the viability "tnesses of females and males whose genotype is A G , denoted by F G and M G , are given by
respectively, for i"1, 2, and the mean viability "tnesses of the female and male populations can be written in the forms
respectively. From eqns (5) and (6), the frequencies of allele A in the female and male populations at the time of reproduction, denoted by pJ and qJ , are given by
respectively. Then, from assumption (III), the frequencies of allele A in the female and male populations at the beginning of the next SEX-AND FREQUENCY-DEPENDENT MODEL generation will be
respectively. Equation (8) shows that, for any initial frequencies of allele A in the female and male populations, we always have p"q at the beginning of the next generation. Thus, the line
is invariant after the initial generation. This implies that the female and male populations have the same gene frequency distribution at the time of conception at least after the initial generation. From this property and using eqn (7), eqn (8) can be rewritten as
where
is the marginal "tness of allele A (see e.g. Ewens, 1979) . Similarly,
will be the marginal "tness of allele A .
Evolutionarily Stable Strategy
The concept of an equilibrium strategy is one of the most important theoretical concepts in classical evolutionary game theory (Maynard Smith, 1982; Hofbauer & Sigmund, 1988; Lessard, 1990; Cressman, 1992; Weibull, 1995) . Following Cressman's (1996) approach for twospecies models, we de"ne a strategy pair (x*, y*) (where 0)x*, y*)1) as an equilibrium strategy if and only if
i.e. both female phenotypes S and S and both male phenotypes R and R have the same "tnesses. It is assumed throughout that f *, m*'0. Notice that condition (11) involves only the phenotypic parameters of the model. Solving eqn (11) yields
and ! O0.
This inequality implies that both G and G cannot be zero for i"1, 2. Equation (12) if an equilibrium strategy (x*, y*) exists, then it must be unique.
From the classical evolutionary game model, an ESS is a strategy with the property that, if all members of the population adopt it, then no mutant can invade under the in#uence of natural selection. For the two-species model developed by Cressman (1996) , which concerns the coevolution of two populations, an ESS (which is also called a two-species ESS by Cressman) is de"ned to be a strategy pair that cannot be successfully invaded by any mutant pair.
For our model, since both the female and male strategies are determined by alleles located at a single locus, i.e. the strategy is sex dependent, we have the following de"nition: De5nition 1. An equilibrium strategy pair (x*, y*) corresponding to the genotype A* is an ESS if and only if the allele A* cannot be invaded by any mutant allele under the in#uence of natural selection when all members of the population have genotype A*.
In order to illustrate this de"nition, suppose that the population consists of individuals with genotype A* or AK where the genotype AK corresponds to the strategy pair (xL , yL ). Since the female and male populations have the same gene frequency distribution at the time of conception, let 1! and be the frequencies of alleles A* and AK in the population, respectively, at the time of conception. Then the frequency of phenotype S in the female population and the frequency of phenotype R in the male population are given by
respectively. From eqn (5), the viability "tnesses of the females and males whose genotype is A* are
respectively. Similarly, the viability "tnesses of the females and males whose genotype is AK are
respectively. From eqn (10), the dynamics for is given by the recurrence equation
Our de"nition means that if the strategy pair (x*, y*) is an ESS, then, when '0 is su$ciently small, we must have ( , that is,
for all possible (xL , yL ) but (xL , yL )O(x*, y*). Notice that, when is su$ciently small, F M and M M can be approximated as
Since the strategy pair (x*, y*) is an equilibrium strategy de"ned by eqn (11), then, from the SEX-AND FREQUENCY-DEPENDENT MODEL
inequality (20) holds if and only if
so that inequality (22) (0, the necessary condition for inequality (24) to hold is
In order to determine a su$cient condition for inequality (24) to hold, we "rst consider the situation for sO0. For sO0, Z(s, t) can be expressed as
Notice that Z I (0)"a(0 owing to eqn (27) and the solution of the equation dZ I /dv"0 is
Moreover, we know that On the other hand, when the variable v is de"ned in the interval [0, R), i.e. pure strategy pair (0, 0), or (1, 1), is an equilibrium strategy (this means that (x*, y*)"(0, 0), or (1, 1)), or when the variable v is de"ned in the interval ( !R, 0], i.e. pure strategy pair (0, 1), or (1, 0), is an equilibrium strategy (this means that (x*, y*)"(0, 1), or It is useful to point out the following facts:
(1) If there are no asymmetric contests in the population, i.e. "0 and "0, then an equilibrium strategy is an ESS if and only if (0 and (0. This result corresponds to Maynard Smith's (1982) classical Hawk}Dove model (see also Lessard, 1984; Hofbauer & Sigmund, 1988; Cressman, 1992; Weibull, 1995) .
(2) If there are no symmetric contests in the population, i.e.
"0 and "0, then no equilibrium strategy can be an ESS. This result corresponds to Maynard Smith's (1982) classical Battle-of-the-Sexes model (see also Hofbauer & Sigmund, 1988; Cressman, 1992; Weibull, 1995) .
(3) If both symmetric and asymmetric contests coexist in the population, our result is similar in some aspects to Cressman's (1996) result for the two-species model, but our condition for an equilibrium strategy to be an ESS is more restrictive. This means that if an equilibrium strategy is an ESS under our de"nition, then it must be a twospecies ESS under Cressman's (1996) de"nition (see also Tao, 1998) .
Stability Analysis

EQUILIBRIUM POINTS
Obviously, an interior "xed point of eqn (10), that is a frequency p in (0, 1) satisfying p"p, is characterized by the equation
Notice that at most three interior "xed points can exist since eqn (34) is a cubic equation in p. Similar to Lessard's (1984) de"nition of phenotypic and genotypic equilibria (see also Hofbauer & Sigmund, 1988; Cressman, 1992) , we introduce the following terminology. (11), then p* is called a phenotypic equilibrium corresponding to an attainable equilibrium strategy pair (x*, y*), i.e.
For convenience, p* is called an ESS equilibrium if and only if (x*, y*) is an ESS. Otherwise, p* is called a non-ESS equilibrium.
(ii) All possible non-phenotypic interior "xed points of eqn (10), where the marginal "tnesses of alleles A and A are equal, i.e.
are called genotypic equilibria. 
DYNAMICAL PROPERTIES
In this subsection, we study the dynamical properties of eqn (10). From the theory of di!erence equations, a possible equilibrium of eqn (10) (interior or on the boundary) is stable if "dp/dp"(1 at this point. Moreover, the transformation is monotone if dp/dp'0.
From eqn (10), we get dp dp " 1 2 
LOCAL STABILITY OF THE ESS EQUILIBRIUM
If a phenotypic equilibrium p* corresponding to the strategy pair (x*, y*) exists and p* is an ESS equilibrium, then p* is locally asymptotically stable if dp dp N * (1.
From the de"nition of an ESS equilibrium and eqns (36)}(38), we get dp dp N
Since p* is an ESS equilibrium, we have inequality (22) 
Therefore, if p* is an ESS equilibrium, then, we must have dp/dp" N * (1. This result can be summarized as follows.
Result 4. For eqn (10), an ESS equilibrium is locally asymptotically stable if it exists.
Conclusion
The main purpose of this paper is to develop ESS theory for sex-and frequency-dependent viability selection model. In our model, since the strategies of female and male individuals are determined by alleles located at a single locus and are sex dependent, any given genotype corresponds to a strategy pair. Thus, a strategy pair is an ESS if and only the allele corresponding to this strategy pair cannot be invaded by any mutant allele. Obviously, this de"nition is identical to Maynard Smith's (1982) de"nition for the sexindependent matrix game diploid model (see Section 1). On the other hand, although the two-species ESS de"ned by Cressman (1996) also concerns a strategy pair, the concept of a twospecies ESS cannot be applied directly to our model. In fact, the ESS condition for the sex-and frequency-dependent viability selection model turns out to be more restrictive than the condition for a two-species ESS.
In Section 4, we have shown that an ESS equilibrium must be locally asymptotically stable if it exists. This means that for the sex-and frequency-dependent viability selection model, the population may evolve to an ESS. But this may not necessarily be the case for the twospecies discrete-time model. 
